An in-depth look at the complicated and situation in the Afro-Colombian city of Tumaco

This dispatch from Tumaco, by Adam Isaacson of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), has an excellent summary of the current state of affairs in Tumaco, including a historical summary, a discussion of US policy, Colombia's governability problem, human rights violations, and Afro-Colombian responses to the situation. And video! The original post is on the Just the Facts blog, jointly run by the Center for International Policy, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America.

In troubled Tumaco, little progress

During the last week of April a group from the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA, Washington), the Center for International Policy (CIP, Washington), Asociación MINGA (Bogotá), and the Institute for Development and Peace Studies (INDEPAZ, Bogotá) traveled to Tumaco, on the Pacific coast of Colombia’s far southwest, near the border with Ecuador.

Driving through Tumaco, Colombia (Short version) from Adam Isacson on Vimeo.

With a population of 180,000 and a land area about equal to Rhode Island, the city and surrounding municipality (county) of Tumaco make up one of Colombia’s most troubled and violent territories. Every year, Tumaco is listed as Colombia’s number-one or number-two municipality for the cultivation of coca, the crop used to make cocaine (the country has 1,100 municipalities). It also has one of the country’s highest murder rates — well over 100 homicides per 100,000 residents — and a strong guerrilla and paramilitary-group presence.

We traveled to Tumaco because it is also one of about fourteen sites chosen for a U.S.-supported military and development aid program that is, in a way, the successor to “Plan Colombia.” Known as “Consolidation” or “Integrated Action,” this large-scale program purports to introduce a functioning government in long–neglected territories.

Our four organizations are carrying out a joint project to monitor this program. Though its design indicates that learning has taken place since Plan Colombia’s launch in 2000, we have concerns about Consolidation: the role of the military, coordination between government bodies, consultation with communities, effects on land tenure, and several others.

In each of the chosen zones, the Consolidation strategy begins with offensive military operations to establish “security conditions.” Then, it aims quickly to bring in the rest of the government to provide basic services in a phased, coordinated way. According to the Consolidation program’s documents, the desired end state is the military’s near-total pullout from the zone, leaving behind a functioning government, greatly reduced violence, the absence of armed groups, and the elimination of drug production.

Though we were looking at it in Tumaco, the United States has invested most heavily in Consolidation elsewhere in Colombia since the program began, in its current form, in 2007. A December 2009 report by the Center for international Policy, “After Plan Colombia,” looks at Consolidation in two of those zones of greater investment: the La Macarena region south of Bogotá, and the Montes de María region near the Caribbean coast. U.S. officials tell us that the program is advancing with Washington’s support in the southern part of Tolima department, west of Bogotá, but we have not yet visited that zone.

Though it appears in the list of consolidation zones and is clearly a priority because of drug production, we hadn’t heard as much about how the program was proceeding in Tumaco. We chose to visit the city, though, because of a close tie to U.S. policy: its crisis of violence and drug-trafficking owes in part to Plan Colombia’s unintended consequences.

Fumigation planes share the tarmac at Tumaco's airport.

In 2000, a US$1.3 billion aid package from the United States, the first outlay of funds for Plan Colombia, allowed a dramatic expansion of aerial herbicide fumigation in the department of Putumayo, about 250 miles east of Tumaco, bordering Tumaco’s home department of Nariño. At the time, Putumayo was Colombia’s largest producer of coca. Plan Colombia extended into Putumayo a huge aerial herbicide fumigation program. U.S. planners did not accompany this spraying program with anywhere near enough alternative development assistance for Putumayo’s farmers. In fact, Plan Colombia lacked any real attempt to establish a permanent civilian government presence there; it continues to be weak in Putumayo.

As a result, many Putumayans whose crops were sprayed and found themselves with no economic options migrated to the Pacific coast, particularly Tumaco. The town of Llorente, in the eastern part of Tumaco municipality, is occasionally called “Putumayito” because of the large number of Putumayan migrants.

The displacement of coca, and coca growers, to Putumayo upset the social order in what was then one of Colombia’s most forgotten corners. Tumaco’s mostly Afro-Colombian population lives in near-total isolation from the rest of the country, engaging in subsistence agriculture or growing basic cash crops like coconuts, cacao, or plantains. Lining the many rivers flowing into the Pacific are communities settled by freed and escaped slaves, whose descendants were excluded and held apart from Colombia’s national life.

In 1993, two years after Colombia approved a progressive new constitution, a new law — Law 70 — recognized the landholdings of these and hundreds of other Afro-Colombian communities in the country’s isolated, undeveloped, densely jungled Pacific lowlands. These landholdings, known as Community Councils, are held in common. Titled collectively, they make up a significant percentage of Tumaco’s land area. A smaller but significant amount of land is in the hands of indigenous communities.

This major advance in recognition of their property rights, unfortunately, came at the same time that these communities entered into greater contact with the outside world. Instead of government officials offering security, justice and basic services, though, “contact” meant encounters with narcotraffickers and large landowners, who were often the same people.

The narcotraffickers were attracted by Tumaco’s strategic value. Its rivers have proven to be ideal corridors for taking shipments of drugs to the Pacific Ocean — directly or through Ecuador — and on to Mexico, Central America, and the United States. Its dense jungles provide cover for laboratories to make cocaine. Its coastal mangrove estuaries provide innumerable hiding spots for boats transshipping drugs. (They also hide “semi-submersibles:” homemade submarines, usually pulled behind a boat, that carry tons of cocaine at a time and are difficult to detect.) As coca cultivation migrated to Tumaco during the early 2000s, the municipality became a center of cocaine cultivation, production, and transshipment -– one of few territories where all phases of the cocaine production process take place simultaneously.

For their part, large landowners saw vast expanses of well-watered, undeveloped land ideal for large-scale, capital-intensive agribusiness. These include profitable products like African oil palm and cattle ranching. The oil palm — used increasingly in biofuels — experienced a boom during the mid-2000s, along with massive land purchases, until a blight destroyed most of Tumaco’s crop.

While landowners began encroaching on the Community Councils’ territories, the profitable coca trade proved to be a temptation to many of the Councils’ residents. UNODC has found (PDF page 62) coca-growers earning a net income of perhaps US$10-12 per day — about double the minimum wage in Colombia’s formal economy, and better than most cash crops offer. Its product, a highly portable paste that traffickers later refine into cocaine, is far easier to market in roadless territories.

With the coca boom, however, came a far greater presence of illegal armed groups whose presence in Tumaco had been only sporadic before. In fact, while economics enticed some to grow coca, many others have been forced to plant the crop by the guerrillas or paramilitaries who held sway in their territories.

The FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (National Liberation Army) guerrilla groups started out raising funds to buy guns by taxing coca growers, but soon went on to participate in production and trafficking. They built up their presence in the municipality during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Guerrillas, especially the FARC’s 29th front, began killing community leaders whom they viewed as threats to their dominion, extorted funds from business owners, and controlled communities’ movements along the rivers.

The guerrillas had little competition from Colombia’s state, which was barely present in Tumaco beyond a few military and police posts and a badly corrupt municipal government. Government representatives spent very little time outside the county seat, leaving the forgotten communities along the rivers at the armed groups’ mercy.

The drug trade’s wealth then attracted an illegal armed group from the other side: the pro-government, drug funded paramilitary network known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC. The AUC’s so-called Liberators of the South Bloc, headed by Guillermo Pérez Alzate, who went by the name “Pablo Sevillano,” moved into the zone after 2000. As in other zones of guerrilla influence, the newly arrived paramilitaries carried out a brutal wave of hundreds of extrajudicial killings and massacres of those they believed to be guerrilla collaborators. The violence displaced tens of thousands of people to Tumaco’s town center and to cities elsewhere in the country, while thousands more crossed the border into Ecuador. For their part, Colombia’s security forces combated “Pablo Sevillano’s” men only on the rarest of occasions.

After pushing the coca economy from Putumayo, Plan Colombia followed the coca crops to Tumaco. The U.S. and Colombian governments’ initial response to Tumaco’s drug and violence crisis was not to strengthen the state’s presence in the municipality. Instead, Plan Colombia offered a sharp increase in aerial herbicide fumigation over the Community Councils’ collectively held lands. Nariño, led by Tumaco, has been by far the most fumigated of Colombia’s 32 departments during the past ten years.

"People gave up ... leaving their own land abandoned." from Adam Isacson on Vimeo.

Víctor Quiñones of the Chagüí Community Council, whose USAID-funded development project was repeatedly fumigated.

The fumigation came with alternative development programs, financed by USAID and other donors. These covered only a small portion of the affected communities, though, and could do little in a context of statelessness, lack of transportation, uncertain land tenure, and out-of-control violence. Worse, the U.S.–backed Colombian National Police fumigation program has insisted on spraying any coca plants it detects, meaning that alternative development projects funded by USAID have routinely been sprayed merely because of the proximity of coca plants.

Despite large-scale fumigation, coca growing has proved stubborn in Tumaco. This is largely a result of the state’s absence from most of the territory and the lack of other economic alternatives for growers. So when the U.S. and Colombian governments begin pursuing Consolidation — a strategy that explicitly seeks to build up the government’s on-the-ground presence — Tumaco appeared to be a prime candidate.

Despite that, our attempt to evaluate Consolidation’s performance in Tumaco was more challenging than we expected. The main problem was that nobody in the municipality seemed to know what we were talking about, even though Consolidation had officially been functioning and present in Tumaco since 2008.

In other parts of the country, Consolidation is also often known as CCAI, after the name of the agency in the Colombian Presidency (Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action) that manages it. In Tumaco, however, when we asked civil society leaders about the CCAI (pronounced “Say-Kigh”), they responded, “What kind of fruit is that?” A top municipal government official told us of having received e-mail about the program and hearing nothing since, until the CCAI held a meeting in early April.

The CCAI "Coordination Center" in Tumaco.

We paid a visit to the CCAI headquarters for Tumaco: it is a room with desks, computer equipment and maps at a beachside hotel complex heavily used by police and contractors involved with coca-eradication missions. The office is meant to coordinate all government agencies’ activities to establish a presence in the zone; the Tumaco “coordination center,” however, appeared to have only a handful of staff and a very small administrative footprint.

Unlike La Macarena — a zone where the United States has helped finance hundreds of millions of dollars in military offensives and development projects — Tumaco has seen very little investment in the Consolidation framework. Instead, the activities the United States is actually paying for in Tumaco look more like the same Plan Colombia programs of a decade ago.

As in Putumayo circa 2002, fumigation is massive, while alternative development projects lag behind in stateless, insecure areas. Building up a civilian, institutional state presence on the ground is still a faraway goal toward which little progress is notable, even in the town center.

When fumigation eliminates growers’ legal crops or food crops, food security assistance is rarely available. Local human rights and development workers affirmed that a significant portion of those who displace from Tumaco’s Afro Colombian communities today are fleeing repeated fumigation.

Why has “Consolidation” stumbled at the starting gate in Tumaco? The main reason is resources. Its far-flung geography makes Tumaco very hard to govern, and its high poverty and indigence rates mean that needs are greater. A proper Consolidation program in Tumaco would require an immense amount of funding, a large multiple of what USAID, other donors and the Colombian treasury are currently providing. The United States has not planned to invest such resources in Tumaco — a great shame considering the amount that the United States has invested in forced eradication — and Colombia’s government has done little to fill the gap.

"The sense of brotherhood returned" from Adam Isacson on Vimeo.

Leaders of the Las Varas community exude optimism.

To date, the significant exception appears to be a program begun by the Nariño governor’s office called “Si Se Puede” (Yes We Can). This is a small program –- the governor’s office, in the hands of a leftist opposition party under Governor Antonio Navarro Wolff, a former leader of the disbanded M-19 guerrillas –- is strapped for cash and heavily indebted. Nonetheless, the Si Se Puede program did answer positively to a request for development financing from the leaders of one Afro-Colombian Community Council in Tumaco: the community of Rescate-Las Varas.

Here, in exchange for the community’s willingness to eradicate their own coca, the government is offering assistance with USAID support. Farmers are getting food-security aid as they switch to legal cash craps like cacao, coconuts, managed forestry, fish farming and others. The successful eradication of most coca in Las Varas is leading local officials to consider the community a model. Local coordinators of the CCAI in Tumaco say they plan to work with the Las Varas community to guarantee further investment and to extend the model elsewhere in Tumaco.

This expectation to provide future support was the main concrete example we heard of the Consolidation program’s activity in Tumaco. As Governor Navarro (and likely his party) leave office at the end of this year, the sustainability of the government’s commitment to Las Varas is in question. Consolidation may have to pick up where “Sí Se Puede” left off.

This may be far more difficult than it sounds. The community's trust in the government remains fragile, and relationships forged with the governor's office may not be easily transferrable to a new entity. Meanwhile the Las Varas community faces friction with other Community Councils uncomfortable with its embrace of the state or unhappy that they are not receiving similar investment.

The Consolidation program is proceeding haltingly in conditions that continue to be among the least secure in the country. Indeed, the Las Varas community has suffered the death of six or seven village leaders (depending on whether or not some were accidents or homicides) as a result of their choice to abandon coca and work with the state. The FARC guerrillas remain very active in Tumaco and neighboring municipalities, participating in the drug trade, targeting local leaders, particularly indigenous leaders, attacking military and police targets, and making travel difficult on the few existing secondary and tertiary roads.

"Nobody can move around here, not even to fish." from Adam Isacson on Vimeo.

Two anonymous sources, indicating points on a map, talk about security conditions in Tumaco.

Further downriver and along the coast itself, one finds the heirs of the AUC paramilitary group, which disbanded officially in 2006. (Pablo Sevillano, the head of the AUC’s Liberators of the South Bloc, is now in a U.S. prison serving time for drug trafficking.) Former mid-level AUC commanders now control smaller groups that exist mainly for the drug trade, but still regularly threaten local leaders and engage in land theft. These so-called “emerging criminal groups” are popping up all over the country. Many reportedly have little to fear from the police and military, though this is usually a result of corruption, not alliance. Some in fact do drug business with the FARC guerrillas, and often fight each other for territory.

In Tumaco, the “new” paramilitary group that appears to have wrested control from the others is called Los Rastrojos (the word refers to what is left behind after a harvest), which is one of the most powerful of the new groups nationwide. The Rastrojos now control most riverine traffic in coastal Tumaco, especially the boatloads of cocaine that continue to leave the zone. The FARC, however, do continue to control some rivers and corridors, and joint guerrilla-paramilitary drug shipments have been detected.

The security situation in Tumaco remains dire. Most people we talked to, regardless of their social sector, were reluctant to talk at length about the perpetrators of the zone’s violence and narcotrafficking. Some authorities, however, said that the number of incidents of murder and other violent crime had dropped since the middle of last year; this, they suspect, may be a result of the Rastrojos’ defeat of their paramilitary rivals and assumption of greater territorial control. Tumaco’s trafficking routes may be somewhat less contested than before, and the FARC — with the exception of some recent kidnapping-for-ransom attempts in the city center — are largely forced to operate upriver, further from the coast.

The government response to the Rastrojos remains unclear. As in other parts of the country, the armed forces tend to consider them primarily to be a police responsibility. Colombia’s police forces, however, are meant to operate in urban areas (with the exception of small, specialized units like Carabineros or Junglas). When they operate in rural zones, as they usually do, the Rastrojos end up in a “doughnut hole” of security-force responsibility: they are in the jurisdiction of army and marine units who consider them primarily to be a police issue. This is compounded by a chronic lack of coordination between the armed forces and police.

Amid this panorama of violence and narcotrafficking, the Consolidation or Integrated Action effort has barely begun. Tumaco’s challenges make it difficult to determine where to start, especially when U.S. and Colombian government funding hasn’t been generous.

The Colombian government is currently evaluating or rethinking the national Consolidation effort. When the government announces the results of this rethinking — probably in June — these will include a reduction in the number of “Consolidation” zones from the current fourteen. Several zones will see their CCAI offices close, and promises of state presence and investment will go unfulfilled. The remaining zones, however, will presumably see far greater investment than before.

It is likely that Tumaco will remain in the national Consolidation scheme. If so, perhaps a year or two from now Tumaco’s local leaders will have heard and seen enough of Consolidation to be able to evaluate the program and gauge its impact on their communities — which to date has been nearly zero.

This is a "first take" on our trip to Tumaco written by WOLA Senior Associate Adam Isacson. We'll soon post observations from other participants in this visit and one we took to the La Macarena Consolidation zone. We'll be visiting La Macarena and other Consolidation sites again in a few months, and publishing joint reports about each.

Documental "Welcome a Tumaco"

No he tenido tiempo para ver este documental, pero es sobre el Carnaval de Tumaco.
Fue hecho por Natalia Rueda e Ángela Ramírez en 2005.

Un promedio de 4,4 personas son asesinadas cada día en Tumaco

De El Tiempo:

El recrudecimiento de la violencia en ese puerto se ha convertido en un cerrojo para sus habitantes . 'La cosa acá es grave, nadie quiere hablar', dice un habitante que pide la reserva de su nombre.

Ayer, precisamente dos hechos conmocionaron a la población. En la vereda Cajapi, a unos 45 minutos de la cabecera municipal, un grupo de jóvenes que departía en una vivienda para celebrar un cumpleaños fue baleado por desconocidos. 'Hubo cinco personas muertas y seis más heridas', dijo el secretario de Gobierno, Fabio Trujillo.

La masacre perpetrada por hombres que portaban armas de largo alcance se registró a la 1 de la mañana. Según testimonios, ingresaron por la parte trasera de la vivienda y dispararon indiscriminadamente.

Pero no es el único hecho violento de las últimas horas. Ayer también, a las 8 de la mañana, fue baleada cuando transitaba por la avenida la Playa de Tumaco, María Alexandra Satizábal Nazareno, de 38 años, quien se desempeñaba como visitadora del Sistema Nacional de Matrículas de la Secretaría de Educación.

Las autoridades tienen gran atención en este caso pues el pasado 25 de abril la titular de esa dependencia Irma Liliana Correa, fue víctima de un atentado que la mantiene en delicado estado de salud en una clínica de Cali.

'Ese día fue lamentable. El atentado se presentó a las 11 de la mañana, pero la funcionaria estuvo mucho tiempo tirada en el sitio donde cayó porque por miedo nadie se acercó a ayudarla', relató un ciudadano.

El fin de semana en la vereda Pindal desconocidos lanzaron una granada a un establecimiento donde departían una menor de 15 años y dos hombres. Tras la explosión cada uno recibió un tiro de gracia.

Tras un consejo de seguridad el general Gustavo Adolfo Ricaurte, comandante de la Regional 4 de Policía, atribuyó la oleada de muertes violentas y amenazas contra docentes al narcotráfico.

'Las bandas delincuenciales organizadas que operan en la jurisdicción de Tumaco están afectando el desarrollo normal de un municipio que se ha caracterizado por ser solidario, hospitalario y turístico', dijo el oficial.

Entre las medidas que se adoptaron para contrarrestar los altos niveles de inseguridad que se registran en esa jurisdicción del departamento, figura la puesta en funcionamiento de la línea de atención al público 123 antes de que termine el mes. 'Nos hemos comprometido en reforzar la Policía Judicial, con el fin de mejorar algunos procesos que tienen que ver con la inteligencia', agregó el general Ricaurte.

Igualmente el comando del Departamento de Policía Nariño se comprometió a conformar un escuadrón motorizado que permita una reacción más rápida ante los llamados de la comunidad.

Así como a ejercer un mayor control sobre el tráfico de motocicletas mediante campañas pedagógicas, con el fin de disminuir la incidencia del sicariato y los niveles de
accidentalidad.

La Diócesis de Tumaco mostró su preocupación por los actos de violencia que se han incrementado en el transcurso del año contra miembros de la comunidad indígena Awá.

El secretario de Gobierno Trujillo dijo que una comisión integrada por la Fiscalía, Policía Nacional, Procuraduría, Das y Personería Municipal se encargará de analizar los homicidios.

De acuerdo con el Comité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, las muertes violentas en el departamento de Nariño se han incrementado en forma considerable. Javier Dorado, vocero del organismo, reveló que 'paradójicamente no ha evolucionado favorablemente el respeto a los derechos humanos en la región, por el contrario hay un alto porcentaje de violación a los mismos'.

El alcalde Neptalí Correa dijo que la seguridad del municipio depende de la acción de las autoridades.

Desastre natural en Pacífico nariñense - Deadly floods in Colombian Pacific

From El Colombiano
Mira rises 20 meters
The Mira River surprised residents of Tumaco early yesterday after water levels rose more than 20 meters. Six people died and 14 more have been reported missing. According to the Office of Disaster Prevention and Response the situation is critical: 6.000 people have been affected and 270 homes were destroyed. Of the 100 rural settlements (veredas) in the municipality, 62 are flooded; new shelters have been set up in order to accommodate the growing need. The Ideam recommended special precautions be taken in riverside areas like Cumbitara, Pisada and Policarpa. There is also an alert in effect for the possible overflowing of the Telembí River.

De El Colombiano

El Mira se subió 20 metros y se llevó 270 casas

SE REPORTAN 22 desaparecidas y 6.000 damnificadas. De las 100 veredas de Tumaco, 62 están inundadas; 20.000 hectáreas quedaron anegadas.
Clara Isabel Vélez Rincón - Medellín
Publicado el 18 de febrero de 2009

Dos días seguidos de lluvia no llamaron la atención de los habitantes de Tumaco. Allí la temporada seca y la de invierno en poco o nada se diferencian. Solo en la madrugada del lunes, el ruido -como de una explosión- los sacó de la cama. Era el río Mira que se metía a sus casas.La creciente fue tan intensa que hasta la estación automática de medición del Ideam desapareció.Uno de los trabajadores del Instituto que vive en la ribera del Mira, reportó una creciente de siete metros por encima de la cota de inundación. Minutos después, él y su familia tuvieron que ser rescatados por los organismos de socorro. Ayer, la cota de inundación se había excedido en 20 metros.Ellos hacen parte de los 6.000 damnificados. Según la directora de Gestión de Riesgo para la Atención y Prevención de Desastres, Luz Amanda Pulido, se reportaron 22 desaparecidos, pero no se han encontrado cadáveres.

La cifra podría aumentar pues hay varias veredas que están prácticamente aisladas porque las carreteras Timbilí-Candelillas, La Peña-Peña Colorada, Puerto Nidia, Cajapí, Agua Clara-Bucheli y la que va a la bocatoma del acueducto, colapsaron.Por eso, la Armada Nacional ayuda a la evacuación de los damnificados en las zonas costeras. El Ejército rescató a 172 campesinos de la vereda La Playa.Hay que apoyarlosEl casco urbano de Tumaco se quedó sin luz, gas y agua. Tampoco hay comida, por eso la Fuerza Aérea tuvo que transportar 20 toneladas de alimentos y ayuda humanitaria.Como la fuente del acueducto está contaminada, desde Pasto se envió una planta potabilizadora que tiene capacidad para suministrar 25.000 litros diarios.Se estima que 270 viviendas quedaron inservibles. La cárcel también se inundó y los 250 reclusos tuvieron que acomodarse en el segundo piso de la edificación.En la zona rural la situación no es la mejor. De las 100 veredas del municipio 62 están completamente inundadas. Se perdieron 20.000 hectáreas de palma y cultivos de pan coger.

El ministro del Interior, Fabio Valencia, quien hizo un sobrevuelo por la zona del desastre, pidió a los colombianos solidaridad, mas si se tiene en cuenta que entre los damnificados hay 1.200 niños y 900 ancianos, que serán llevados a nueve albergues.Al desastre de Tumaco se suma el desbordamiento del río Telembí, en Barbacoas. Allí se reportan 250 familias damnificadas.Humberto González, meteorólogo del Ideam, explicó que el clima no se está comportando como es tradicional en esta época, donde debía predominar el tiempo seco.Las lluvias que se presentan en el Pacífico se deben a un remanente del fenómeno de La Niña. A esto se suma un frente frío que viene de Perú y Brasil. Ese organismo mantiene la alerta por crecientes de los ríos Mira, Patía y Telembí, en Nariño.

More Remote-Controlled Drug Submarines/Más Submersibles Caseros

Submersible casero/Home-made submarine - from Reuters Pictures
http://www.daylife.com/photo/0fU49HP9UO5bn

A factory for making homemade, remote-controlled drug submarines was dismantled in Tumaco. Say what you will about the many evils of the drug trade in Colombia, you've got to admit that people are resourceful.

Una fábrica para hacer submersibles caseros de control remoto fue desmantelado en Tumaco. Todos sabemos los numerosos males del narcotráfico en Colombia, pero la astucia de la gente no deja de asombrar - imaginate, sumersibles caseros!
Link/Enlace

Atentado en Tumaco

Hace unos años estaba bastante caliente la ciudad de Tumaco. Había calmado mucho, pero parece que de nuevo hay actividad violenta por parte de los grupos ilegales. Ojalá no se trate del principio de una ola de violencia tal como hemos visto en Buenaventura...

Dice El Tiempo:

Agosto 18 de 2007
Un muerto y siete heridos dejó ataque con cilindro bomba a vehículo militar en Tumaco (Nariño)

El hecho se produjo este sábado, y entre los lesionados se encuentran un oficial y un soldado, confirmó el gobernador de Nariño, Eduardo Zúñiga.

De acuerdo con al mandatario seccional, el ataque contra el vehículo del Ejército ocurrió cuando circulaba en el sitio conocido como la Guayacana.

Zúñiga agregó que los heridos están siendo atendidos en el hospital de Tumaco.

De acuerdo con el reporte, al parecer el cilindro bomba fue lanzado por guerrilleros de las Farc contra la tanqueta del ejército, pero al explotar impactó también contra un vehículo de servicio público que transitaba por el lugar.

Con AFP

Emergencia Hunaitaria en El Charco y La Tola/Humanitarian Emergency in El Charco y La Tola

The situation in the Pacific coast of Nariño province I mentioned a few days ago
has only gotten worse. Of the 6,000 or so people that have taken refuge in the downriver towns of El Charco and La Tola fleeing the fighting between the military and the guerrillas, about 3,000 remain. Despite claims to the contrary, it is unclear whether the 3,000 who left have returned to their upriver homes or moved onto the the also precarious situation of displaced people in places like Buenaventura, Cali, and Tumaco. Before giving you the links to "information" about this, I want to let you know that I'll be participating in a fundraising event to get food and basic supplies to the people in El Charco and La Tola. It's on May 5th at the Wesley United Methodist Church in Washington D.C. Don't worry, aside from the musicologist, there will be music, too... I'll let you know more in a future post.

• A good summary (in Spanish) of the situation by El Tiempo/ Una buen resumen de la situación por El Tiempo: Link/Enlace
• An El Tiempo editorial (in Spanish)/Un editorial de El Tiempo: Link/Enlace
• An account of what's going on by the NG) Church World Service/Un relato de lo ocorrido (en inglés) de la ONG Church World Service: Link/Enlace
• UN Press Release urges the Colombian government to provide more attention ot the displaced/Emitida de prensa de la ONU recomienda al gobierno colombiano atender más a los deplazados (en inglés) Link/Enlace

La situación en el Pacífico Nariñense que mencioné hace algunos días sigue bastante crítico. De las 6.000 personas que habían tomado regugio en los pueblos del rió abajo - El Charco y La Tola, unas 3.000 siguen. Pero a pesar de lo que dicen en los medios, no es muy claro si los restantes 3.000 volvieron a sus veredas o si se fueron a Buenaventura, Cali, y Tumaco en calidad de desplazados. Tmabién les les cuento que voy a estar participando en un evento para recaudar fondos para los desplazados en El Charco/La Tola, el 5 de mayo en la Wesley United Methodist Church en la ciudad de Washington. Habrá música - si tienen chance, se los recomiendo para poder contribuir también.

Reggaetón tumaqueño

I promised I would put up some reggaetón from Tumaco. Here's a crash course - it's coarse, crass, crude, but its danceable and fun as hell and you know you love it. My personal favorite is Leka el Poeta, who goes back and forth between rap and reggaetón. He has a kind of creativity for diss records that make his Tiradera against Cali group Element Black quite frankly the best diss record I've ever heard in any language - period. I couldn't find any video of it, unfortunately, but look it up - there's this genius four bars where Leka manages to simulatenously deliver a blistering diss, rep local cuisine ("más comida que la papa aburrajada") resurrect old-fasioned traditional Tumaco words ("sos rebambuquiada") and invents the untranslateable compound insult "catredobletripleultrasuperhipermegatriplemalpariculillevada".

Prometí que iba a colocar reggaetón tumaqueño - he aquí el curso intensivo. Vos dirás que es una música facilista, ordinario, horrible, insultante - listo pues pero también es liricamente creativo, eminentamente bailable y vacanísimamente gozadera, y sabés que si no lo gozás en público lo harás en privado.

Mi favorito personal de los tumaqueños es Leka el Poeta. Él pega igual de duro en rap o en reggaetón, y tiene una creatividad para las tiraderas que hace se tiradera al grupo caleño Element Black mi favorita número uno de todas las tiraderas de la historia en cualquier idioma. No encontré video de ella, pero buscatela - hay una parte en que Leka logra simultaneamente entregar una tiradera bastante contundente, representar la comida colombiana ("más comida que la papa aburrajada"), sacar de la olla al lenguaje popular tumaqueño tradicional ("sos rebambuquiada") e inventar la palabra compuesta más ofensiva de la historia ("catredobletripleultrasuperhipermegatriplemalpariculillevada".)

Aside from these brilliant diss records, here is his most popular dance song, with the quaint title of - "Negra de trasero grande baila" ("Dance, Big-Assed Black Woman").

Aparte de sus geniales tiraderas, aquí su disco bailable más pegado, titulado "Negra de trasero grande baila."

Here he is being uncharacteristically uncontroversial on the Jorge Barón show.

Aquí está con Jorge Barón.

Two new videos of Leka's. I have to say though, for a guy who takes Element Black to Task on the Tiradera for "kissing ass and copying the Puerto Ricans", it's pretty ironic that these two recent videos completely bite Don Omar (on the first one) and Daddy Yankee (on the second). Oh well.

Dos videos nuevos de Leka. Pero tengo que decir, para un man que dice de Element Black en su Tiradera que "lamben en copian a los puertoriqueños," es bastante irónico que estos dos videos copian a Don Omar (en el primero) y Daddy Yankee (en el sugundo). Pero bueno.

A former rival of Leka's (a rivalry that produced another ingenious diss record on Leka's part), now reconciled, is Misteriosos, who is probably the favorite in Tumaco, with his real deal old school Bounty Killa type of voice (and, ironically, a skinny little kid's body!). My favorite song of his, "Culo llegue" doesn't seem to have a video, but here's another good one, "Guapetéalo."

Anterior rival de Leka (rivalidad que produjo otra tiradera de parte de Leka), ahora reconciliado, es Misterioso, probablemente el favorito en Tumaco, con su grave voz estilo vieja guardia panameña/jamaiquina (pero da risa que en lo físico es un pelao flaquito). Mi disco favorito de Mistrerioso, "Culo llegue" no parece tener video, pero aquí hay otro disco bueno, "Guapetéalo."

Probably the best-known Tumaco reggaetón act in Colombia is Master Boys, who have scandalized the country with their ultra-raunchy hits "La quemona," about a cheating wife, and "Micaela", about a precocious young girl who goes to the doctor to find a cure for a strange sensation she's feeling. Here are their videos.

El grupo tumaqueño más reconocido a nivel nacional es probablemente Master Boys, quienes escandalizaron el país con sus éxitos super-sensuales "La quemona" (sobre una mujer infiel) y Micaela (sobre una vírgen precoz quien va al médico para tratar una sensación extraña que siente). Los videos:

Master Boys' "Micaela" live/en vivo:

Last but not least, a newer duo, Brayman y el Negro José, with "Manitocao," warning women about a pathological butt-grabber on the dance floor. Which goes to show that yes, reggaetón does in fact have its own standards of decency, and that butt-grabbing goes over the line...

Finalmente, un duo más reciente, Brayman y el Negro José, con "Manitocao," advirtiendo las mujeres de la llegada de un pervertido en la pista. Lo cual muestra que el reggaetón sí tiene un estandar de decencia, y que el "Manitocao" pasa la raya...

Sabor tumaqueño en el Internet/Tumaco flavor on the net

I just found this nice little web page from the beautiful city of Tumaco on the Pacific coast. Link

Among other things, they have a page with music videos, from the Fania All-Stars in Africa to vallenato, as well as some good Tumaco reggaetón. (Tumaco is the legendary home of some of Colombia's best rap and reggaetón artists: Leka el Poeta, Master Boys, Misterioso, and others, which I'll write about in another post...)

Acabo de encontrar una página bacana sobre la lindísima ciudad de Tumaco, la Perla del Pacífico. Enlace

Entre otras cosas, tiene una página con videos de música, desde los Fania All-Stars en África
al vallenato actual, además del buen reggaetón tumaqueño. (Tumaco tiene unos de los mejores raperos colombianos, entre ellos Leka el Poeta, Master Boys, Misteriosos, y otros. En otro post escribiré un poco sobre ellos...)